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- Daniel A. Dombrowski, The Philosophy of Vegetarianism,
Amherst: University of Massachusetts Press, 1984, pp. 188
Was Plato a vegetarian? We can't
be sur·e, but in this book Daniel Dom
browski
produces
incontrovertible
arguments' to show that Plato took
vegetarianism ser'iously and may have
even practiced it himself.
Until I read this book, I had sup
posed that Greek vegetarianism was
based on sheer superstition, or, at
best, on the dubious doctrine of the
transmigration of the psyche.
Dom
browski shows that while these rea
sons were important, there were ethi
cal r~asons as well.
The book is an essay in the h is
tor·y of ideas, not a polemic.
He
shows that vegetarianism was an idea
with a history of nearly 1,000 years
in ancient Greece, defended not only
by Pythagoras and the Pythagoreans,
but also by Empedocles, Theoph r'as
tus, Plutarch, Plotinus and especially
by Porphyry.
Then the doctri ne
vanished for the next 1,700 years,
disappearing so completely that the
champions of contempora ry ph i losoph i
cal vegetarianism saw themselves as
creators of a new ethic.
He points
out that the sub-title of Singer's Ani
mal Liberation is "A New Ethics for
Our Treatment of Animals" as a case
in point.
Thus, his metaphor for the history
of philosophical vegetarianism is that
of a phoenix, rising from the ashes of
an almost forgotten former existence.
By reminding us of ancient vegetari
anism, he proposes to use the techni
ques and insights of contemporary
philosophy to show the weaknesses of
ancient vegetarianism, but he also
thinks that the ancients have some
thing worthwhile to say on the sub
ject.
The only other full

treatment

of

ancient vegetarianism is a tome enti
tled Der Vegetarismus in der antike
published in Berlin in 1935 by Johan
nes Haussleiter who treats vegetar·ian
ism as a "stuffed dinosaur" and as
"antiquarian lore"· rather than a living
ethical option.
Dombrowski, on the
other hand, is a practicing vegetar·ian
who rna kes no secret of where he
stands on this issue.
Thus, he has
more sympathy for the ancient vegeta
rians than probably any other modern
writer.
Up until now, historians of
ideas have treated it as either a
religious taboo or stemming from anti
quated medical ideas which have no
relevance to our time.
Cer·tainly no
one has taken it seriously.
It's time
we did.
What is to be gained from a
detailed study of the ancient vegetari
an s 7.- " Apa l·t from the i ntri n s ic worth
of studying the history of any impor
tant idea, there is the discovery that
the topic is incomparably richer· and
deeper than we had supposed. Then
too, there is the inescapable fact that
many lines of thought, stemming from
utterly different premises and presup
positions,converge toward
similar
conclusions.
Vegetarianism is neither
a contempora ry fad nor the hobby of
sentimentalist cran ks.
Dombrowski shows that the ancients
had several bases for their position.
Of course we have long r·ecognized
that transmigration of the psyche and
health were important, but he shows
that the mythological belief in a past
golden age and a concern for the ani
mals themselves were also important
factors.
Why did the phoenix die (in the
West)? Dombrowski agrees with oth
ers that Christianity is to blame.
Augustine, reacting against his former.
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Manicheanism, taught that to refrain
fr'om killing animals was utter' super
stition.
Dombrows ki
sees
th ree
phases within the period of the ashes.
The fir~st phase closed with the Middle
Ages, while the second phase was
Renaissance
humanism,
which
was
pr'ecisely
that:
h uma nism.
The
return to the ancient dictum "Man is
the measure of all things" ensured
that animals would continue to be
exploited.
This phase gets worse
with Car'tesianism since animals were
seen as mere bodies, machines, auto
mata.
The only difference between
cow and a clock was that the cow is
constructed by a better craftsman.
The third phase he calls the "era
of excuses."
Here the best thinkers
come to the brink of philosophical
vegetarianism, then fall back to the
soft, safe lap of convention.
Mont
aigne,
Voltaire,
Rousseau,
Hume,
Schopenhauer, Bentham and Darwin all
chickened out (excuse the expression)
rather than put their semi-convictions
. into action.
This point reminded me
quite fOI'cefully
of the
sorts· of
excuses I used to rna ke to myself
efore I finally came to the point of
. putting my own personal convictions
into practice.
Dombrowski has command of the
classics. Not only is he completely at
home with the major fig u res of anti
quity but also with such minor writers
as Dicaerchus, Ephorus, Aratus, and
others.
There can be no doubt that
he has done his homework.
I n the last chapter he leaps to the
20th century to discuss Hartshor~ne
and Rorty with i n the context of an
ethic based on virtue.
This chapter
is more ar~gumentative than the first
six.
He tries to establish the point
that vegetarianism is obligatory rather
than super~erogatory, and for every
one,. not just for philosophers.
He
briefly takes Tom Regan to task for
his view in an early paper that "it is

III

not irredeemably wrong (for the mu 1
titude?) to eat meat, but most of
those (philosophers?) who read his
essay a re meat eaters who oug ht to
change."
This doesn't sound much
like the Tom Regan I know, so it is
apparent that he has long left thi~
view behind.
Dombrowski attacks Richard Rorty
for his position that moral status is
based on actual or potential member
ship in
the linguistic
community.
This doctrine is contained in section 3
of chapter 4 of Philosophy and the
Mirror of Nature, entitled, "Pre-lin
guistic awareness."
Here Rorty tries
to accou nt for the difference between
our treatment of pigs and our treat
ment of animals like koala bears by
sayi ng that we can imagi ne koalas
talking to us whereas we have more
difficulty in imagining pigs talking to
us.
Dombrowski
thinks
Rorty
is
being prescriptive in this section,
telling us that it is not "irrational" to
do this.
After going back and re
reading this section carefully, I think
there is a fair chance that this whole
passage is merely descriptive,
an
attempt to accou nt for the fact that
we have so little sympathy for pigs,
even though they score high on intel
ligence tests.
When. Rorty says it is
not "irrational" to do this, he is
cl ea rl y not say in 9 th at is rational to
do it either. His point is rather that
morality is whatever our society will
let us get away with.
He goes on to
make this clear.
"This (killing pig~
and saving koalas) is not "irrational,"
any more than it is irrational to
extend or deny civil rights to the
moronic (or fetuses,
or aboriginal
tribes,
or Martians).
Rationality,
when viewed as the formation of syllo
gisms based on discovery of "the
facts" and the application of such
principles as "Pain should be mini
mized" or "Intelligent life is always
more valuable than beautiful unintelli
gent bei ngs," is a myth." He goes on
to point out that the "facts" which
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must be discovered in drawing these
lines cannot be divorced from senti
sentiment.
No amou nt of "ca refu I ph i 10
10sohical analysis" is going to show us
the difference between "coldness of
heart and foolish sentimentality."
Dombrowski accuses Rorty of being
"arbitrary" about this and of making a
factual empirical claim that is not uni
universally true.
He contends that, he
doesn't find koalas, much less bats,
more attractive than pigs, nor can he
more easily imagine them speaking
than pigs.
If I understand Rorty
correctly, he would heartily agree
that our preference for some animals
over others is "arbitrary" if this
means not based on the discovery of
some relevant facts.
If that is what
it means, Rorty would welcome the
charge, even insist on it.
On the other hand, Rorty clearly
overemphasizes the role of language in
according moral status to animals.
If
his view were simply that we care
more about the an imals that a re more
nearly like us, he would be right.
Snakes are perhaps the most despised
and feared animals of all in our culcul
ture. Surely this is because some of
them
are
poisonous
rather
than
because we can't imagine them as
speaking to us (or to each other).
I
believe that tactile sensations play a
major role in our allocation of moral
status to non-humans. We value those
like cats with fur which we can
stroke, but find creatures with slimy
or scaly skins repulsive.
Dombrowski

correctly questions Rorty's choice of
the bat as an animal that humans can
identify with.
Many, if not most,
humans associate all bats with vampire
bats and it is no accident that the bat
is a symbol of Halloween. When peo
people still took evil spirits seriously,
bats were often identified with them,
apparently because they like dark
places and have smooth "reptilian"
wings.
So Dombrowski is cot~rect
when he challenges Rorty's empir~ical
generalizations.
The book ends with a su rvey of
Hartshorne's
"psychicalism"
which
Dombrowski finds much more to his
liking.
One of the stated aims of the book
is to give the contempor'ary debate
about vegetarianism some much-needed
dept h . He has do net hat.
Wi t h t his
book, Dombrowski emerges as a major
figure on contemporary philosophical
vegetarianism.
His
scholarship
is
thorough
and
relevant.
sol id,
According to the dust jacket of the
book, he is an assistant pr~ofessor~ of
philosophy at Creighton.
I hope this
indicates he is a fairly young man who
will produce a great deal more wor'k of
this quality in the future.
One final note:
in an age of
cheap,
quick
and
often
shoddy
printed products this book is a pleas
pleasu re to handle.
The qual ity of the
paper, printing and binding are a fit
fitting match for the quality of the
author's work.
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